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Abstract: 
As  citizenries  around  the  world  become  increasingly
dissatisfied  with  the  traditionally  accepted  model  of
governance, the challenge is to look to forms that better
meet a demand for rule by the people. Individuals have
largely  lost  their  ability  to  influence  decision-makers
within  bureaucratic  and  administrative  governments,
whose interests are increasingly felt to be divergent from
their own. Within ‘western democracies,’  it is held that
power derives from the people, who appoint their leaders
through  the  majoritarian  approval  of  a  voting
constituency. Though an imperfect claim to the ideal of
“government  by  the  people,”  it  is  this  system  of
representative democracy that has thus far proven to the
most widely adopted attempt to establish a legitimizing
link between the citizen and the ruler. As we experience
widespread  failures  by  governments  to  address
environmental,  humanitarian  and  social  challenges  of
the 21st century, the effectiveness of the representative
democratic  system  to  act  on  the  collective  will  of  the
people  is  called  into  question.  This  paper  will  study
critiques  of  representative  democracy  as  well  as  its
foundations in the state, going on to investigate alternate
forms  of  democracy  emerging  in  different  social  and
theoretical  movements  of  the  20th  and 21st  centuries,
arriving at an altogether new articulation of democracy. 
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Introduction: 
Democracy is in crisis.  This can be seen around the world today, where protest
movements and civil strife dot the landscapes of formerly sanguine nation-states that
once  held  up  their  satisfied  citizenries  as  the  mark  of  success.  Countries  that  have
encountered  widespread  upheaval  in  recent  years  include:  Chile,  Argentina,  Spain,
Greece, Ukraine, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States. Though the nature of
the protests and their origins vary greatly - from economic collapse to corruption, failures
in education and needs for constitutional reform, to name a few - they were all directed at
governments whose claim to legitimacy is the representation of the people’s will. As the
world experiences a crisis in effective action, representative democracy, therefore, is also
in a state of crisis. 
Systems striving for the democratic ideal appoint leaders through the majoritarian
approval of a voting constituency: a link between population and political representatives
that  is  proving too tenuous to  ensure that  the challenges  of  our  time are  effectively
addressed. Though once held to be the gold standard of good decision-making, rule by the
elected has proven unable able to answer the people’s call for determination. Taking the
increasing dissatisfaction of citizenries as an indicator of this failure, this paper will set
out to uncover why representative democracy is not able to satisfy the people, why the
nation-state may be the underlying problem and what new sort of ordering can resolve
this.
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Chapter 1 will set out with a discussion of legitimacy and how it relates to the
democratic ideal of “rule by the people,” as derived from the Ancient Greek root (demos =
people,  kratia=  rule  by).  By  taking  this  comprehensive  measure  of  legitimacy  as
qualifying demand, it will be shown why representative democracy cannot measure up to
it. Chapter 2 will look at the premises of the the state at large, in order to explain how
and why a division between the people and power is  maintained.  In reaction to this,
arguments for a countervailing conception of politics will be investigated. Chapter 3 seeks
to reinstate decision-making authority to the will of the people and explore the possibility
of stateless democracy, through the discussion of 20th century revolutionary councils as
well as contemporary activist networks. 
The  conclusion  to  this  paper  elaborates  a  new  proposal  for  a  decision-making
model,  which  meets  the  democratic  demand  for  rule  by  the  people  and  is  therefore
“omnilegitimate.” Developed throughout the paper are unique definitions and coinages,
that are listed and defined, for the sake of clarity, in the glossary. Appendix A offers a
comparative  table,  wherein  the  attributes  and  features  of  conventional  state-based
representative democracy are juxtaposed to those of a new, bottom-up form of democratic
decision-making. Appendix B is a diagrammatic depiction of this new model, following
from a formula developed throughout the text. Appendix C shows a scene from the May
Day  protests  in  NYC  on  May  1st,  2012  relating  these  theoretical  ruminations  and
deductions about democracy back to the ferment out of which they were born. 
Some of the questions posed in the course of this paper are: “can a formal political
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union meet the democratic demand for complete approval by the people?”, “what happens
to  demands  for  radically  horizontal  decision-making  when  met  with  a  demand  for
political action?”, “can the possibility of a complete plurality coexist with the possibility of
complete unity?”, “how can new democratic practises be established within the hegemonic
framework of representative nation-states?” and “is omnilegitimacy scaleable?” In taking
a holistic view and utilizing different approaches to these questions, it is hoped that the
paper will allow the reader to form a palpable impression of a new and yet unrealized
kind of democratic society. Though arguably a utopian (Gr. outopos, ou=not, topos=place)
project, it is on the assurance of its fundamental feasibility that it proceeds. 
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“The communities are promoting democracy. But the concept seems vague.
There are many kinds of democracy. That’s what I tell them. I try to
explain to them: ‘You can operate by consensus because you have a
communal life.’ When we arrive at an assembly, they know each other,
they come to solve a common problem. ‘But in other places it isn’t so,’ I tell
them. ‘People live seperate lives and they use the assembly for other
things, not to solve the problem.’ And they say, ‘no,’ but it means ‘yes, it
works for us.’ And it indeed does work for them, they solve the problem. So
they propose that method for the nation and the world. The world must
organize itself thus…And it is very difficult to go against that because that
is how they solve their problems.” 
Subcommandante Marcos
(Blixen & Fazio)
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Chapter 1:
The Democratic Demand
Democracy:  from  Greek  δημοκρατία or  dēmokratia,  dēmos ‘the  people’  and  kratia
‘power,  rule.’  -  “Government  by  the  people;  that  form  of  government  in  which  the
sovereign [i.e. supreme] power resides in the people as a whole, and is exercised either
directly by them (as in the small republics of antiquity) or by officers elected by them.” –
Oxford English Dictionary
Section I - Roots of Democracy 
A democracy is legitimitate, so long as the people say it is. Its basis - according to
the  translation  from  its  Greek  meaning,  reprinted  above  -  is  in  the  people.  In  a
democracy, therefore, legitimacy - understood as the justification of political action based
on an accordance with its own foundational values -  follows from the approval of  the
people. (See Glossary) In other words,  political action can be deemed legitimate, in a
democracy, only if it has the approval of the people. For this reason, it is the premise of
democracy  as  “rule  by  the  people,”  which  uniquely  offers  the  possibility  of  complete
legitimacy, contingent upon the will of the people. 
Max  Weber  identified  a  self-generated  “legitimacy-belief”  (Legitimitätsglaube)
process, according to which “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly
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of  every  kind  of  willingness  to  obey,  is  a  belief,  a  belief  by  virtue  of  which persons
exercising authority are lent prestige” (Weber, 1964: pg. 382) Weber’s implication is that
legitimacy  is  not  an  absolute  value,  but  a  condition  that  depends  on  an  agreement
between the values of a system of authority and a ‘belief’ in these. While it may be said
that the legitimacy of any form of government depends to a certain measure upon a belief
by the people, this measure in no other form aspires toward completeness as it does in a
democracy.  The  legitimizing  body  of  individuals  named  in  any  political  system
determines the necessary measure whereby this political authority gains its legitimation.
The measure of a legitimizing belief, so long as it is in competition with exterior forms of
justification, is incomplete. In a monarchy, a king may claim to rule by divine decree and
therefore seek merely to maintain in the court around him a belief. Similarly, members of
an aristocracy may look only to their moneyed peers for legitimacy, and not beyond. This
shows, that where the legitimizing belief constitutes only part of a government’s basis of
power, it is in competition with alternative claims to authority. 
Only a democracy is held to have its basis of justification in the approval of the
people as a whole. The legitimizing belief, therefore, constitutes not part of its basis of
power, but its entirety. This unique intersection between the democratic basis of “the
people” and Weber’s conception of legitimacy, as following from the “belief” by the people,
creates the unique possibility of a fully coherent system of legitimation, residing in the
entire  population.  In  the  ideal  of  democracy  we  see  the  possibility  of  a  complete
concurrence of the foundational values, and the Weberian belief. Thus - for the first time
in  Western  political  thought  -  the  exercise  of  political  power  could  be  completely
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contingent  upon an approval  by the people.  What  presents  itself  is  the  possibility  of
absolute  justification,  the  condition  of  which  would  be  absolute  approval.  Only  in  a
democracy, therefore, can we speak of a political system whose foundational values allow
for complete legitimacy. 
 It is important to note, however, that this legitimizing totality of all the people
inheres  in  democracy  only  as  an  ideal.  This  ideal  was  perhaps  best  articulated  by
Abraham Lincoln, in his Gettysburg Address of 1863, with the words “government of the
people, by the people, for the people.” Lincoln went on to say that this form of political
organization “shall not perish from the earth,” (Lincoln, pg. 1) though it is arguable that
the utopian notion he described had never yet  come to true fruition upon the world.
Though many countries around the world today, including the United States of America,
are commonly referred to as democracies, it is a difficult claim to defend that these are
governments fully “of the people, by the people, for the people.”  Their claim to being
democratic  requires  qualification,  by  the  affixing  of  the  terms  ‘representative’  and
‘majoritarian.’ They are representative, insofar as the democratic power resides in the
people to appoint their leaders, not lead directly, and majoritarian because legitimizing
approval of leaders needn’t be by all, but by most. 
Political  discussion  dealing  critically  with  representative  democracy  gained
traction towards the early decades of the 20th century, in Europe as well as the United
States. Following the demise of several monarchies and empires during World War I,
electoral  democracy  came  to  be  understood  as  the  historically  ascendant  form  of
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governance. It was at this time of upheaval that Woodrow Wilson advocated “the world
must be made safe for democracy,” (Wilson, pg. 1) so that the United States may export
its  type of  democracy to the rest  of  the world.  As a result  of  this  new awareness  of
democracy as an expanding concept,  it  came under more scrutiny.  In order  to better
understand representative democracy and its failure to meet the comprehensive demand
of the democratic ideal,  it should therefore prove worthwhile to look to some of those
insights  and  arguments.  In  particular  Harold  Laski,  British  theorist  and  Labour
politician and Walther Lippmann, political commentator and founder of the periodical
New Republic, lay the groundwork for this project. 
Harold Laski  in  chapter I  of  his  1935 book  Democracy in Crisis,  offers  a lucid
account of the shift in paradigm that gave rise to this new political order: 
“Political  democracy  developed  in  response  to  a  demand  for  the
abrogation of privilege.  In modern European history, its cause was the
liberation  of  a  commercial  middle  class  from  the  domination  of  a
landholding aristocracy. To free itself, that middle class formulated a body
of  liberal  generalisations which culminated in the widespread  grant  of
universal  suffrage.  Their  underlying  philosophy  was  the  well-known
Benthamite argument, that since each man in a political democracy was to
count for one, and not more than one, and since each was, on the whole,
the best judge of his own interest, universal suffrage would permit the
translation of the majority will into the substance of legisation. Sinister
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interest, it was urged, belonged only to a few; privilege could not resist the
onset of numbers. Representative democracy,  on the basis of equal and
universal  suffrage,  would  mean  the  creation  of  a  society  in  which  the
equal interests of men in the results of the social process would be swiftly
recognized. The rule of democracy was to be the rule of reason.” (Laski,
1935: pg. 49)
Laski’s narrative explains the emergence of representative democracy as the
result  of  a  legitimizing-belief  whose  measure  was  evolving.  Because  a  system whose
approval  by  a  landholding  aristocracy  no  longer  satisfied  this  expanded  measure,
‘universal’ suffrage was granted. This is what Laski calls the rule of reason, because its
basis was in the people as a whole,  and negotiated by means that were perceived to
adequately satisfy the right of  each to be accounted for.  This process of majoritarian
“recognition,” through representation was held at the time to be the best way in which
the will of each could be respected. Representative democracy, thus understood as the
historical result of an evolving measure of the legitimizing-belief, should by no means be
taken as its final product. Rather, it could be viewed as a mere step towards complete
democracy, something which would have been an unreasonable leap to expect from the
feudal system preceding it.
 The growth in representative democracy in the last century can be correlated with
an increasing belief that legitimacy of leadership cannot come from the church, the force
of  strength or by heredity;  but must come from the people themselves.  This  growing
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belief, however, has not yet reached its consummation in the truly legitimate rule of all
the people, by all the people, for all the people. Furthermore, representative democracy
may  not  so  much  be  a  stepping  stone  as  a  mutation  along  the  path  towards  true
democracy. It is important, after all, to note that its step towards the people’s capacity for
political agency, i.e. decision-making capability, was not one towards self-determination
of the people. Rather, it was, as Laski points out, an effort towards the right of all to vote.
The essential difference thus characterizing the old Greek form of democracy and setting
it apart from the currently accepted form is that it aspired towards an exercise of power
by the demos or people. Representative democracy, on the other hand, places its faith in
what is thought to be a necessary division between power and the people. This belief
follows  from  an  understanding  of  the  complexities  of  politics,  as  far  exceeding  the
capacities of the citizenry. 
Section II - Representative Rule
Walther Lippmann argued in his books  Public Opinion (1922) and  The Phantom
Public (1925), that the people are not fit to make decisions on delicate political issues and
that the delegation of responsibilities to politicians acting on their behalf follows quite
naturally. In The Phantom Public, he laid this argument bare: 
 “We must assume that the members of a public will not anticipate a
problem much  before  its  crisis  has  become obvious,  nor  stay  with  the
problem long after its crisis is past. They will not know the antecedent
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events, will not have thought out or willed a program, and will not be able
to predict the consequences of acting on that program. We must assume as
a theoretically fixed premise of popular government that normally men as
members of a public will not be well informed, continuously interested,
nonpartisan,  creative  or  executive.  We  must  assume  that  a  public  is
inexpert  in  its  curiosity,  intermittent,  that  it  discerns  only  gross
distinctions, is slow to be aroused and quickly diverted; that since it acts
by aligning itself, it personalizes whatever it considers, and is interested
only when events have been melodramatized as a conflict.” (Lippmann,
1925: pg. 65) 
 
The picture which Lippmann has here painted is one that is very skeptical of the
people’s capacity for self-determination and direct engagement in the political process.
Given his enumeration of the many shortcomings that members of the public have, not
least among which is their disinterest in the general political process, it should not be
surprising  that  Lippmann  expressed  sympathy  for  the  vesting  of  political  decision-
making power with so-called ‘executives’ and ‘administrators.’ The way in which citizens
outside the “executive” realm can be engaged in politics, is by their ability to approve or
disapprove of  certain proposals  or their  advocates through voting.  What they cannot,
according to Lippmann, do, is “create, administer or perform the act they have in mind.”
(1925:  pg.  52)  Conversely,  the  responsibility  of  executives  and  administrators  -  as
Lippmann  understood  it  -  was  to  work  independently  on  issues  or  policy  needing
attention and respond to the popular demand of the people where it has taken the form of
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public opinion and expressed itself through a majority vote. Thus, the manifestation of
the individual’s will within a representative democracy is public opinion. 
Public opinion, though arguably a ‘crude’ way to engage the people in politics, is in
Lippmann’s mind the best way for the disparate masses to come to political decisions.
“Great masses of people” writes he, “though each of them may have more or less distinct
views, must when they act converge to an identical result. And the more complex the
collection of men the more ambiguous must be the unity and simpler the common ideas.”
(1925:  pg.  69)  He  here  identifies  the  core  premises,  the  singularization  upon  which
representative democracy is built. Though he recognizes this reductive nature of public
opinion,  he  understands  such  a  loss  of  multiplicty  to  be  a  problem  in  any  form  of
government. Only a majoritarian democracy, however, utilizes the system of voting to boil
a multiplicity of ideas down to a few that can be translated into a ‘public opinion.’ The
relation of public opinion to legislation is indirect. Attempts to mobilize public opinion to
govern directly results, according to Lippmann, either in “failure or a tyranny.” (1925: pg.
69)  He  goes  on  to  argue  that  “it  [the  public]  is  not  able  to  master  the  problem
intellectually,  nor to deal with it except by wholesale impact.” Public opinion may be
reductive, but only in its reduced and generalized form can any of it be taken and used,
indirectly, to influence political ends. 
 Laski, like Lippmann, suggests that the prospect of direct citizen engagement is
rendered  impossible  by  the  overwhelming  complexity  of  political  issues  at  hand.  He
writes that “the very nature of a political democracy precludes the possibility of action
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that is at once swift and comprehensive. The area of interests to be consulted is too great,
the risk of technical error too manifold, the possibility of defeat upon the relevant issue
too large, the dread of novelty too intense for the maintenance of unity to be possible in
an area of profound transition.” (Laski, 1935: pg. 72) Laski here seems to concede to the
need for a delegation of political agency to representatives recognizing the logic of such a
division within a representative democracy. It is important, however, to note that it is
precisely swift and comprehensive action which the “very nature of political democracy”
seems to preclude.  Thus the problem, according to Laski,  may very well  lie  with the
structuring of political decision-making that representative democracies lend themselves
to. More so than Lippmann, he expresses deep-seated skepticism about public opinion as
an indicator  of  the  will  of  the  demos.  “Parties”  writes  Laski  “have  to  capture  public
opinion. But the elements of public opinion do not grow out of knowledge, and they are
not  the product  of  reason.  Knowledge and reason may count,  but they remain,  quite
definitely,  at the service of  the interests in conflict.”  (1935: pg.  68)  Thus understood,
public opinion is a highly malleable thing, able to be manipulated and interpreted to the
ends of cunning politicians and parties.
Both Laski and Lippmann understand public opinion to be the invariable conduit
whereby the people can give voice to their interests within an electoral democracy. It
cannot be argued that either Lippmann or Laski are in complete agreement with this
structuring  of  decision-making  power,  as  they  both  offer  very  critical  analyses.  “The
justification  of  majority  rule  in politics”  argues  Lippmann,  “is  not  to be  found in its
ethical superiority. It is to be found in the sheer necessity of finding a place in civilized
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society for the force which resides in the weight of numbers.” (1925: pg. 58) Rather than
presenting an ideally equanimous system of reaching decisions, the majoritarian system
of making decisions and appointing leaders offers the most basic way in which the force of
numbers  can be  reckoned  with  and the  bulk  of  a  constituency  pleased.  According to
Lippmann,  therefore,  “elections  based  on  majority  rule”  can  be  understood  as  “a
sublimated  and denatured civil  war,  a  paper mobilization without  physical  violence.”
(1925:  pg.  58)  In  this  reading,  representative  democracy  was  not  born  out  of  some
universal  acknowledgement  of  its  eminent  legitimacy,  but  out  of  sheer  necessity  to
appease majorities and systematize conflicts of interest. 
Representative  democracy,  he  argues,  has  “identified  the  functioning  of
government  with  the  will  of  the  people.”  This  he  calls  a  “fiction,”  as  the  “intricate
business  of  framing laws and of  administering them through several  hundred public
officials is in no sense the act of the voters nor a translation of their will.” (Lippmann,
1925: pg. 73) Laski aligns himself with this diagnosis, stating that “there is an essential
truth to Rousseau’s taunt that it [the electorate] is free only at election time, and that
freedom is but the prelude to a new domination. It cannot choose the representatives it
wants; it can only strike blindly at those whom it feels a passing indignation. Its will is
largely meaningless - even where it has a will - save as it can find expression through the
programme of the parties.” (Laski, 1935: pg. 75) Between both theorists there emerges a
clear consensus that an electoral representative democracy does not give full voice to the
will  of  the  people.  Where  they  disagree,  however,  is  on  whether  or  not  this  failure
invalidates such a system of democracy as a whole. 
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The view which emerges from Laski’s  and Lippmann’s respective treatments of
representative democracy is of a political system that seeks to base its authority in the
legitimizing belief of the people as a whole, but does so imperfectly. Approval is sought to
derive not from the demos as a whole, but from a majority of the population. And even in
this case, it is not approval of political decisions that is required, but of representatives.
This sets representative democracy significantly apart from other possible iterations of
democracy, as well as its Greek ideal. Lippmann seems to believe that these problems are
inherent  to  the theory  of  democracy  itself,  and that  the only remedy can come from
improving mechanisms by which the people form their opinions and make their choices of
representatives, while letting these work independently wherever it is possible. Laski, on
the other hand, identifies a more deep-seated problem within the representative system
and its failure to satisfy a democratic demand. “The decay of our political system” he
writes, “is  due to its failure to embody a new spirit  different from that which it  was
devised to contain. That new spirit brings with it its own sense of values, its affirmation
of a plane of rights antithetic to the old. It is, like its predecessor, a plea for variety in
unity, a search for a new balance between order and freedom.” (Laski, 1935: pg. 61) 
Section III - Paradoxical Disjunction 
Based on the insights gleaned from Laski and Lippmann’s treatments of the flaws
inherent to representative democracy, two distinct critiques present themselves: 
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1) Decision-making power resides with the people only to the extent that voting
allows a constituency to elect leaders and thus vest them with the responsibility of acting
on behalf of their interests. What representative democracy thus loses is a claim to giving
agency to the people that can directly translate into political action. This break in the
causal link between the will of the people and political decision-making (i.e. the people
and power) will henceforth be referred to as the representative ‘disjunction.’
2) The interests of the people can only be ascertained crudely, by attempting to
condense one will out of the many. The problematic notion of public opinion highlights
this difficulty. Underlying attempts to find a cohesive opinion that reflects the interests
of all, is the question of whether consensus can ever be reached non-coercively. In other
words: “can true plurality and unity coexist?” This is an epistemological question, insofar
as it goes to the heart of democratic theory and can be framed as the ‘plurality paradox.’
The disjunction between the people and power arising from representation and its
failure  to  resolve  the  plurality  paradox,  suggest  that  this  form  of  governance  only
meagerly satisfies the democratic demand of ‘rule by the people for the people.’ Thus, the
measure of a legitimizing belief, as suggested in the notion of the demos, the people as a
whole, is not fully met within a representative democracy. Whether this is at all possible
within a state as a uniform entity, is questionable. Hence this problem is referred to as
the plurality paradox. The representative disjunction, it is clear, does not resolve this
conundrum within this form of democracy. Rather, as a mechanism justifying action by
majority approval, it exposes the difficulty of finding a fully legitimate solution to this
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problem.  This,  however,  is  not  to say  that representation,  by definition,  engenders a
disjunction. Rather, it would have to meet the comprehensive measure of a legitimizing-
belief,  in  order  to  resolve  the  plurality  paradox.  Whether  or  not  such  a  form  of
representation is feasible remains to be addressed. 
The  crux  of  the  democratic  problem,  is,  arguably,  the  plurality  paradox.  The
challenge it poses is how to reconcile the will of the individual with the will of the demos
or the people as a whole. As the critiques of Lippmann have shown, attempts to represent
a comprehensive will by means of majority vote and the collation of public opinion almost
invariably end in the repression of individual wills. This, in turn, calls into question such
a system’s claim to true legitimacy. 
Section IV - General Will
Jean-Jacques Rousseau dealt with this issue extensively.  In his 1762 book  The
Social  Contract,  he  distinguishes  between the ‘will  of  all’  and  the  ‘general  will.’  The
former  expresses  the  unordered  disparity  of  ‘individual  wills‘  or  opinions  held  by
members of a population, whereas the latter describes an emergent will that follows from
a recognition by each of the priority of the collective interests over their own. “Only the
general will can direct the powers of the State in such a ways that its true purpose, which
is  the  good  of  all,  will  be  achieved”  (pg.  199)  writes  Rousseau in  Book II.  Thus,  he
understands the subordination of the individual will to the general will to be a necessity
to the functioning of state. This seems to follow from a belief that politics requires a unity
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of purpose, in order to effectively mobilize on behalf of the people. 
Despite Rousseau’s association of the general will with a certain kind of forced
generalization in service of the common good, there can be found in his discussion of this
concept an interesting deviation from this formula. In chapter III of Book II, he argues
the general will “is concerned only with the common interest, the former [will of all] with
interests  that are partial,  being itself  the sum of  individual wills.  But take from the
expression of these separate wills the pluses and the minuses - which cancel out, the sum
of the differences is left, and that is the general will.” (Rousseau, pg. 202) This particular
articulation of the general will is unique in Rousseau’s writing, and seems to contradict it
as a notion based in a sovereign people that can, at times, override the individual will.
Rousseau’s definition of the general will here is a technical one, which can be understood
as the following:  where all the differences of individual wills  are accounted for,  what
remains is a general will. In a Venn diagram with two circles representing individual
wills, the differences would occupy the separate parts and the general will the ellipsis of
intersection. 
Implicit to this particular identification of the general will, is the possibility of no
general will. Where no agreement exists between two individual wills, there would be no
ellipsis of agreement; and thus no general will. This contingent notion of a general will
seems to disagree with Rousseau’s definition in other passages. Thus, for example, he
argues in a footnote to Chapter II: “To be general, a will need not always be unanimous;
but  every  vote  must  be  counted:  any  formal  exclusion  is  a  breach  of  generality.”
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(Rousseau, pg. 200) Here he offers a notion of the general will as something existing
above the will of the individual. It is however the divergent and unique definition, offered
earlier, which serves as the basis for a new understanding of the general will, which will
hencefort be applied. (see Glossary) Of importance to this definition is the general will’s
contingency upon agreement, and its negation by disagreement. Given the size of modern
political constituencies and the great competing claims to what is exigent within them, it
could be argued that this new understanding of the general will may seem reasonable in
theory, though its practicability is still uncertain. 
The forceful imposition of a will which does not give recognition to the nuances of
individual wills - as an idealized reading of Rousseau’s ‘general will’ would - exists as an
inevitability within representative democracies. In such a case - where no general will
emerges -  to say that there is  a ‘public  opinion’  would be to foist false unity upon a
disagreeing plurality. As Lippmann suggested, this generalization is the result of a need
for over-riding decision-making and cohesive action, which the great disparity of opinions
within  a  constituency  would  curtail.  According  to  Lippmann,  therefore,  a  rough
summation of individual wills is necessary to form public opinion. This bandage over the
plurality paradox invariably gives rise to a division of rights and responsibilities between
the people and the so-called ‘executives,’ ‘administrators’ or, simply, politicians. It is this
problem  which  we  have  termed  the  representative  disjunction.  Lippmann  argues  it
cannot be avoided and the best that can be done is to improve the means by which public
opinion is ascertained. Laski, on the other hand, expresses a fundamental dissatisfaction
with  this  mechanism,  arguing  that  public  opinion  -  expressed  within  a  majoritarian
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voting system by approval of political parties and their representatives- is based neither
in knowledge nor reason.
Described  by  Lippmann  as  “denatured  warfare,”  majoritarian  systems  of
democracy  only  accommodate  crude  conflicts  of  interest  and  give  supremacy  to  the
greater bulk of the demos. They cannot respect the individual wills of all. This failure also
precludes the formation of Rousseau’s general will, which can only exist where all the
differences of individual wills have been accounted for.  It  is important to note that a
general will could accordingly only emerge if all individual wills do not in fact completely
cancel each other out and at the bottom of the balance sheet some kind of accordance
remains. This articulation of such a general will can be said to exist at the intersection of
a comprehensive Weberian legitimizing belief and the democratic ideal - which places it
within the demos as a whole. Because it is contingent upon the approval of not a majority,
but the entirety, it can be said to uniquely meet a measure for a legitimizing belief that is
complete. Where approval does not exist completely, however, this measure is not met
and the authority to exercise political power on behalf of the people is not legitimated or
granted. In such a democracy, a gap in the legitimizing belief would engender a gap in
the people’s power. 
 
The  demand  for  complete  legitimacy  suggested  by  a  Weberian  reading  of  the
democratic ideal is one which representative democracies have been shown to fall short
of. The functioning of a representative democracy requires the collation of public opinion,
regardless of whether there exists consensus or not. By this act of constructing a general
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impression of wills, politicians consult the individual only sometimes - in the instance of a
vote. In such a system, the power of the individual to give approval to political leadership
is contingent upon their being in the majority, whereas their disapproval is meaningless
if  they  find  themselves  in  the  minority.  What  is  not  accounted  for,  therefore,  is  the
leverage of  the dissenting  minority  -  what  might be called  the ‘delegitimizing  belief.’
Rousseau’s general will, taken as a qualifying demand for a more just form of democracy -
hinging upon the approval of each, not most - would invalidate traditional representative
democracy.  In  positing  that  political  power  should  fundamentally  depend  upon  the
existence of a general will, i.e. complete accord, the legitimacy of any government that
depends upon anything short of this, is called into question. Following from this rigorous
reading of the democratic impulse, the question arises: “can a political union exist, whose
ability to act depends fully upon the general will?” This question goes not only to the
heart of democratic theory, but the heart of the democratic state itself. 
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Chapter 2: 
The Hegemonic Monster
“‘State’ is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly does it also
lie;  and  this  lie  crawls  from  its  mouth:  ‘I,  the  state,  am the  people.’”
-Friedrich Nietzsche (pg. 49) 
Through Rousseau’s articulation of the general will,  we arrived at the practical
implication of a complete legitimizing belief.  This general will  is predicated upon the
instance of complete accord of individuals, and is thus condional upon it. As such it places
a qualifying demand on action. Where the demand is not met, consensus is not reached
and hence the will of the people not granted. The true implications, however, of such a
legitimizing  requirement  upon  a  political  union  must  yet  be  looked  at.  No  existing
government predicates its exercise of authority on such a rigorous demand, and whether
a state can function without an imposed consensus is increasingly doubtful. The question
that, therefore, emerges is this: “can a state honor the democratic demand for complete
approval?”  In  order  to  answer  this  question,  we  must  look  to  the  theoretical
underpinnings of the state as a sovereign entity.  
The plurality paradox brings light to the crucial problem of democratic theory: how
to reconcile a demand for rule by the people to the need for unified action. Representative
democracy, though arguably the most widely adopted form of governance in the world
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today, has not resolved this challenge. By maintaining a disjunction between power and
the people, it perpetuates the perplexity of plurality and fails to offer any true resolution.
Lippmann  and  Laski’s  treatment  of  representative  government  has  shown  that  the
underlying  reasons  for  this  disjunction  lie  with  a  profound  distrust  of  the  people’s
judgement, as well as a need to accommodate the force of their numbers. Underlying this
diagnosis,  however, is the belief  that political  action must be predicated upon a fixed
political union with a single, centralized body of administration: the state. 
Section I: Monistic Reduction
A demand for a unified articulation of the people’s interest and beliefs does not
only  fail  to  address,  but  exacerbates  the  plurality  paradox.  The  roots  of  this  forced
unification can be traced to the theories of Thomas Hobbes, who in his 1651 tractate
Leviathan argued that the state was something whose very existence depended on an
irreproachable cohesion of its constituent parts. Central to his thesis was the claim that
politics could not function where it was subject to, or contingent upon, the beliefs and
opinions of individuals and that instead it required a body of administration that was
constant and existed above the people. He thus laid the foundations for the theory of
government  that  could  still  be  said  to  underpin  most  present  iterations  of  such,
representative democracies included. 
Leviathan can  be  understood  as  an  extensive  laudation  of  the  political
commonwealth that takes on its truest and best form as the ‘Leviathan.’ What marks the
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Leviathan is its ability to collect its strength in defense of the individual against the
“invasion of Foraigners, and the injuries of one another.” (Hobbes, pg. 354) In order for
this to be possible, however, it is required of citizens to “conferee all their power and
strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by
plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or
Assembly  of  men,  to  beare  their  Person;  and  every  one  to  owne,  and  acknowledge
himselfe to be the Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or
cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and
therein  to  submit  their  Wills,  every  one  to  his  Will,  and  their  Judgements,  to  his
Judgement.” (Hobbes, pg. 354) 
Hobbes’  definition  of  the  common-wealth,  or  Latin  “CIVITAS”  (pg.  354),  as
described above, is in many ways the blueprint for a representative democracy, whose
claim to guardianship justifies the subjugation of individual wills. Taking the union of
voices to be imperative to the function of Leviathan, Hobbes states that an abrogation of
individual  rights  is  instrumental  and  a  largely  unconditional  -  and  unquestioning  -
vesting of individual political agency in one man or a body of representatives necessary to
this end. This articulation is echoed in Laski’s diagnosis of the electorate system, wherein
the electorate is “free only at election time, and that freedom is but the prelude to a new
domination” (1935: pg. 75) In the same way that Hobbes advances the subjugation of the
individual to an eminent sovereign power within the common-wealth, Laski fights this. 
It should not, however, be concluded that Hobbes had himself a disposition towards
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tyranny  or  repression.  Rather,  his  assertions  need  to  be  understood  against  the
background of ill-defined and therefore bleak alternatives. It could therefore be argued
that  with  a  somewhat  poor  imagination,  Hobbes  proclaimed:  “But  to  say  there  is
inconvenience, in putting the use of the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an
Assembly of men; is to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion,
and Civil Warre.” (pg. 394) What he has set up here is a false dichotomy - a reduction
towards  only  two  possibilities,  where  more  may  exist  -  between,  on  the  one  hand,
sovereign  or  supreme  power  vested  with  a  strictly  delineated  body  of  one  or  more
politicians, and on the other hand, pandemonium. Whether indeed Hobbes’ fears about
the basic proclivities of human nature are valid is difficult to know even today, though
more literature based on empirical studies in other forms of social orders is more readily
uncovered.I This  dichotomy  of  possibilities  and  the  monopoly  on  feasible  forms  of
government given rise by it, is reductive and fails to recognize a vast field of alternatives. 
In his  Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty, Harold Laski offers a strong direct
critique of what he calls the state’s “monistic reduction,” (1916: pg. 2) and its sacrifice of
plurality in the name of Hobbes’  Leviathan. Written in 1916, this dissertation vividly
illustrates  the  prevailing  modern  political  striving  towards  consensus  and  calls  into
question its cogency with view to a more pluralistic articulation of political order that
would give recognition to the possibility of there being no general will. “It would be no
4I. See Pierre Clastres’ discussion of the State as a “great misfortune” and the many ways in which different indigenous
societies around the world are organized to resist sovereign consolidations of power in: Society Against the State and An
Archaeology of Violence. Graeber undertakes a similar project in  Fragments of An Anarchist Anthropology, whereas
James  C.  Scott  takes a case-study approach in  The Art  of  Not  Being  Governed:  An Anarchist  History  of  Upland
Southeast Asia. 
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inapt definition of politics  in our time to term it  the ‘search for social  unity’,”  writes
Laski, posing the question: “How far is there an interest of the Whole, a monistic interest,
which transcends the interests of the Many who compose that Whole?” (1916: pg. 2) This
question could be said to underpin any meaningful endeavours in the “search for social
unity.” Knowing the extent to which there exists an interest of the ‘Whole’ would mean
knowing  the  boundaries  of  what  qualifies  as  democratically  legitimate,  insofar  as  it
reflects an agreement of the people.
The State, as Laski views it, embodies a consolidation of power that overstretches
naturally emergent forms of unity, as idealized by Rousseau’s definition of the general
will. “What the absolute is to metaphysics, that is the State to political theory.” (1916: pg.
2)  And  just  as  claims  to  an  absolute  in  metaphysics  may  easily  lead  to  destructive
conflations of concepts, the State’s claim to sovereignty can be found to compromise the
will of each individual. “What for us is here of deepest significance,” writes Laski, “is the
claim that what the State wills has therefore moral pre-eminence. […] You must fuse
your will into its own. It is, may we not without paradox say, right whether it be right or
wrong.” (Laski, 1916: pg. 3) As the arguments of Hobbes have shown, the state is thought
to require a unified will, or the fabrication of such, in order to function. What it cannot
do, it would seem, is give full rein to the individual wills of all, lest its very existence be
thereby called into question. The disjunction of power is, in this case, most pronounced,
“They who act as its [the states]  organ of  government and enforce  its  will  can alone
interpret  its  needs.  They  dictate;  for  the  parts  there  is  no  function  save  silent
acquiescence.” (Laski, 1916: pg. 3) 
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Laski’s critique of the monistic theory identifies it as deeply entwined with the
notion of the state - as one that seeks to enforce a common will where there may not be
one. This critique, therefore, can be applied equally to theories of government that seek to
legitimize power by the forcing a consensus. Although representative democracies only
crudely  address  a  democratic  demand  for  distributive  political  agency,  they  seem to
function largely without force. This functioning is rarely, if ever, on the basis of complete
approval, but of a general submission to the interests of all. Laski vividly describes this
peaceful interaction of subject and state under non-coercive conditions: 
“We have nowhere the assurance that any rule of conduct can be
enforced. For that rule will depend for its validity upon the opinion of the
members of the State, and they belong to other groups to which such rule
may  be  obnoxious.  If,  for  example,  Parliament  chose  to  enact  that  no
Englishman should be a Roman Catholic, it would certainly fail to carry
the statute into effect.  We have,  therefore, to find the true meaning of
sovereignty not in the coercive power possessed by its instrument, but in
the  fused  good-will  for  which it  stands.  Men accept  its  dictates  either
because their own will finds part expression there or because, assuming
the goodness of intention which lies behind it, they are content, usually,
not to resist its imposition. Where sovereignty prevails, where the State
acts, it acts by the consent of men.” (Laski, 1916: pg. 4) 
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According to the conception of state power put forth above, it exists by virtue of an
agreement over its good judgement. Such acceptance, however, is not a requirement for
the sovereignty of a state - at least not by a minority. In a representative democracy this
systemic  violence  manifests  by  a  rejection  of  the  minority.  Resistance  to  imposition
within  such  a  system  can  be  asserted  only  in  a  relinquishing  of  the  vote  and  the
consequent  submission to  the majoritarian will  of  the others.  This  is  by no means a
satisfactory resolution to the plurality paradox, in so far as it further reduces multiplicity
to  an  illegitimate  unity.  Power  generated  by  the  approval  of  the  people  could  be
understood to manifest the true will of all where this process of reduction does not take
place. Alert to this possibility, Laski argues that a “state may in theory exist to secure the
highest  life for its members.  But when we come to analysis  of  hard facts it  becomes
painfully apparent that the good actually maintained is that of a certain section, not the
community as a whole.” (Laski, pg. 5) 
While Laski entertains the possibility that - on the precondition of the people’s
approval  -  state  sovereignty  may  be  considered  legitimate,  Thomas  Hobbes  never
considered such legitimizing contingencies. For Hobbes, the eminence of the state’s will is
to be held entirely above the reproach of individuals:  “In a Soveraign Assembly, that
liberty [protestation against the decrees of Representative Assemblies] is  taken away,
both  because  he  that  protesteth  there,  denies  their  Soveraignty;  and  also  because
whatsoever  is  commanded by  the  Soveraign  Power,  is  as  to  the  Subject  (though  not
always in the sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such command every Subject
is the Author.” (Hobbes, pg. 478) Hobbes’ implication is that the subject’s interests as
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subordinate to the articulation of the sovereign interest by those representing them are
safeguarded by the fact that it is precisely this state-of-affairs that is in their own best
interest. This argument is circular and falters when faced with a demand or interest that
may diverge from the assumptions upon which the the sovereign state is based. 
Hobbes’  conception  of  the  Leviathan  depends  upon  an  invariable  form  of
sovereignty, which the rigorous demand for legitimacy wrought from the democratic ideal
will  not  grant.  Although Laski  is  right in suggesting that sovereignty could -  on the
precondition of complete approval - indeed embody the general will, the state does not
depend on this for its legitimacy. Rather, it is based on the eminent presupposition of
unity, following from its need for singular mobilization; in turn giving rise to a rupture
between the sovereign state and the democratic demand for a comprehensive legitimizing
measure. In answer to this, Laski advances a pluralistic notion of politics, urging readers
to see that it is much more in line with human organisations in everyday society. To this
end,  he  argues:  “Things  are  ‘with’  one  another  in  many  ways,  but  nothing  includes
everything or dominates everything.  The word ‘and’  trails along after every sentence.
Something  always  escapes  […]  However  much  may  be  collected,  however  much  may
report itself as present at any effective centre of consciousness something else is self-
governed and absent and unreduced to unity.” (Laski, 1916: pg. 7) 
A view of the state emerges, as of a structure that by its nature cannot allow for
variegation of the sort described by Laski. Though things may be “with one another in
many  ways”  it  is  difficult  to  accept  the  claim  that  “nothing  includes  everything  or
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dominates everything,”  without  wishing to add the conditional  “should.”  In  his  essay
Politics  as  a  Vocation,  Max  Weber  suggests  that  it  is  in  fact  the  state  which  does
dominate:  “Today  […]  we  have  to  say  that  a  state  is  a  human  community  that
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the
present  time,  the  right  to  use  physical  force  is  ascribed  to  other  institutions  or  to
individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the
sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.” Weber describes the monopoly of force held by
the state as “legitimate,” though it is a specific form of legitimacy i.e. “considered to be
legitimate” as opposed to following from an intersection of a comprehensive legitimizing
belief. It is the monopolistic claim to a legitimate use of force, by the state, that prevents
the manifestation of plurality in any given place that is inherent to Laski’s multivalent
conception of society. 
Section II: Scattering Forced Unity
As the monistic  reduction  of  the  state  posited by Thomas Hobbes  takes on an
increasingly illegitimate mien, we must look to other forms of political order free from it.
While it has been shown that the basis of the state is forced unity, we must turn to its
converse - plurality - in pursuit of democratic legitimacy. In order for a decision-making
process to be beyond the reubuke “this is not my voice!”, agreement must give way to
disagreement wherever it  emerges. For this reason, French theorist Jacques Rancière
offers a radical reconception of politics as a dynamic system, at the heart of which is not a
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pursuit of consensus, but an ennoblement of dissensus.  According to Rancière, politics
itself should never be viewed as an institutionalized practice, but rather an interruption
of such practices. This puts it into sharp distinction from government, which he considers
to be such an institutionalized practice. Under what he calls the “normal” order of things,
human  communities  have  always  gathered  under  the  rule  of  some,  who  qualified
themselves by their strength to rule, by merit or by birth. Against such hierarchial power
structures, emergent throughout history not out of ideals but necessity, Rancière casts
politics as “a deviation from this normal order of things.” (2013: pg. 35) 
As a deviation from any pre-existing order  of  hierarchial  power,  politics  is  the
realm  within  which  Rancière  envisages  new  forms  of  association  to  emerge.  This
anomalous nature of poltics, as he imagines it, expresses itself through political subjects,
“which  are  not  social  groups  but  rather  forms  of  inscription  that  (ac)count  for  the
unaccounted.”  (Rancière,  pg.  35)  This  manner  of  “(ac)counting  for  the  unaccounted”
follows  from a  rejection  of  the  arkhêin  (gr.:  “to  be  first,  rule”)  of  government  and a
recognition of a greater and politically unacknowledged body of individuals that he calls
the demos, Ancient Greek for the common people. “The citizen who takes part in ‘ruling
and being ruled’ is only conceivable on the basis of the demos as a figure that breaks with
all  forms of  correspondence  between a  series  of  correlated  capacities,”  (2013:  pg.  32)
argues Rancière, taking an Aristotelean tenet of democracy and placing it firmly within
his understanding of the role of politics. Thus understood, it is the political process that
breaks from the traditional arkhêin, which in turn allows for the recasting of political
roles according to the demand of the demos. 
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Weber argues that a break with the traditional power-relations, or what Rancière
calls “correlated capacities,” would in fact engender a break with the state. “If no social
institutions existed which knew the use of violence,” writes he, “then the concept of ‘state’
would be eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be designated as ‘anarchy,’
in the specific sense of this word.” (Weber, 1921: pg.1) Following from the insight that the
concept of the state rests upon a considerable element of coercion, the negation of such
conditions means the liquefaction of the ground upon which the state has its foundations.
What follows is ‘anarchy’ in the same sense that Ranière understands it: as a rejection of
illegitimate  rulership,  by  the  demos.  According  to  Weber,  the  demos exerts  itself  by
placing  a  more  rigorous  demand for  legitimacy,  than  the  rule  of  strength.  Rancière,
however, sees in the demos a more radical role, that of a perpetual process of breaking
correspondences, whether based in force or not. 
Rather than one of many different forms of political  regime according to which
power and authority is acted out, Rancière understands democracy to be the only truly
political process, what he calls the “very institution of politics itself.” (2013: pg. 32) This
qualification as political,  which he uniquely attributes to democracy,  follows from his
belief in politics as being the process within which there can exist no domination. The
historical  break-down of  political  legitimacy in  various  forms of  governance  is,  as  he
suggests, the result of its defective rationale. Democracy thus emerges as the first true
political form, insofar as it does not legitimate power, but rather fundamentally calls it
into question. To wit, “the people is the supplement that disjoins the population from
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itself, by suspending all logics of legitimate domination.” (Rancière, pg. 33) Democracy is
therefore to be understood not as a means by which the people are to reach a consensus
and give approval to their representatives, thus legitimating their exercise of power. On
the contrary, it is to be understood as a means by which the people are able to call into
question ‘legitimated’ exercises of power and engage in the practice of dissensus. 
Like Rancière, British theorist Simon Critchley argues that the existence of state
hegemony calls for a radical practice of politics that is fundamentally anarchic. Thus, he
argues  that  “democracy  as  democratization  is  the  movement  of  disincarnation  that
challenges the borders and questions the legitimacy of  the state”  (Critchley,  pg.  119)
From this emerges a view of democracy’s primary function as being a fragmentation of
hegemonic state power.  Such ‘disincarnation’,  as Critchley makes clear,  however,  can
only  occur  through  the  empowerment  of  countervailing  forces,  namely  multiplicity.
“Democratization  is  politicization”  (pg.  119)  argues  Critchley,  in  so  far  as  “it  is  the
cultivation of what might be called politicities, zones of hegemonic struggle that work
against the consensual idyll of the state. Such a disturbance of the state does not have to
be teleologically linked to the construction of an archic nation-subject, but rather towards
the  cultivation  of  anarchic  multiplicity.”  (Critchley,  pg.  130)  Important  to  Crtichley’s
articulation of political democracy is its claim to multiplicity that disjoins the monistic
reduction, without itself constructing a new singularity. Though the struggle for power
occurs in the territory of the state, it does not occur on its terms, but by multiplication. 
Contemporary  moves from a theoretical  model  of  legitimation and qualification
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towards a practice of calling, fundamentally, into question all domination, offers a radical
counterforce  to  the  hegemonic  domination  of  Leviathan.  Whereas  Hobbes  posits  that
political  power  need  necessarily  be  above  the  reproach  of  the  individual,  in  order  to
function in a unified manner, Rancière and Critchley suggest it is precisely the opposite
condition that needs to be invoked. Such a departure from consensus towards dissensus
need not, however, imply the negation of all possibilities of collective decision-making.
While a designation of dissensus as a tool whereby the citizens suspend even legitimate
forms of  domination seems to  suggest  this,  the  term could also  be  conceived of  as  a
qualifying function of the democratic process. Thus, dissensus would not become a central
political function per se of politics, but a tool whereby the individual within the demos is
empowered to call into question claims to consensus, and thereby prevent illegitimate
political decision-making. Where dissensus is given its, arguably, rightful place in the
political sphere, Hobbes’ Leviathan - which the modern democratic state qualifies as -
would  be  disempowered to act  on behalf  of  the  subject  where it  does  not  have  their
approval. 
Under conditions where dissensus is eminent to consensus, the result is complete
plurality. The problem given rise to by such a scenario is an inability to create legitimate
leadership  altogether.  To  Rancière  and  Critchley,  who  conceive  of  democracy  as  an
ongoing practice, whose precise purpose is to cast asunder all authoritarian associations,
this  is  a  desirable  state  of  affairs.  If,  however,  the  democratic  ideal  is  to  retain  its
substantive ability to legitimate political power - where this follows from the approval of
the people - a balance needs to be sought. The role of dissensus is its unique ability to
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preserve the plurality of the demos where it exists. Consensus, however, has the unique
ability to manifest unity of the  demos where it exists. Ideally, therefore, only where a
symbiosis of consensus and dissensus exists, can it be said that the will of the people is
respected in both its plurality and its unity. Here, Rousseau’s articulation of the general
will  can  be  shown  to  epitomize  such  a  symbiosis.  Where  all  individual  instances  of
dissensus  have  effectively  been  accounted  for  and  a  field  of  agreement  remains,
consensus emerges in the form of the Rousseauian general will. Thus, consensus depends
upon the free rein of dissensus in order to be legitimate. Dissensus, on the other hand,
requires the possibility of consensus, in order to be politically meaningful. 
Increasingly radical articulations of the democratic ideal, such as Critchley’s and
Rancière’s, show that institutional democracy manifested in the nation-states of today no
longer stand up to scrutiny.  In  looking at  the evolution of  theoretical  priorities  from
Hobbes  to  the  present,  a  historical  shift  away  from coercive  unity  and a  pursuit  of
consensus, towards plurality and the preservation of dissensus can be identified. As a
focus  on  the  role  of  the  individual  and the  people  thus  grows,  the  legitimacy of  the
forcefully unified state falters. What results could be described as a ‘legitimacy vacuum,’
that leads to a necessarily radical re-conception of politics. In opposition to codified and
institutionalized means of negotiating power and authority, Rancière’s arguments lead
him to call for the dissolution of any form of political unity, whereas Critchley envisages a
state of plural politicities. Understood as a reaction to forced consensus, embodied within
the state as Laski’s monistic reduction, an appeal to dissensus and plurality is a welcome
shift of focus. To the pursuit of a legitimate form of political cohesion that depends upon
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the  approval  of  the  demos,  however,  dissensus  needs  to  be  understood  as  part  of  a
symbiotic  interrelation;  whose  other  half  is  consensus.  As  the  plurality  paradox  has
shown, these two cannot exist in equilibrium within the state, wherefore we must look to
iterations of democracy independent of state sovereignty. 
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Chapter 3: 
The Many-Headed Response
“Freedom  is  always  the  freedom  of  the  dissenter.  Not  because  of  the
fanaticism  of  ‘justice’,  but  rather  because  all  that  is  instructive,
wholesome, and purifying in political freedom depends on this essential
characteristic,  and  its  effects  cease  to  work  when ‘freedom’  becomes  a
privilege.” - Rosa Luxemburg (Luxemburg, pg. 34) 
As  Laski’s  designation  of  the  ‘monistic  reduction’  has  shown,  the  state’s
dependence  for  unified  mobilization  causes  it  to  forcefully  reduce  a  multiplicity  of
individual wills to one. This sovereign claim to power is, as evidenced by the arguments
of Rancière, is increasingly being called into question by countervailing claims to rule by
the  people.  As  a  result  of  this,  a  vacuum  of  legitimacy  opened  up  -  exposing  a
pervasiveness  in  modern  politics  of  illegitimate  power  structures  and  the  absence  of
competing  forms of  organization  that  can  meet  the  democratic  demand for  decisions
satisfying a comprehensive legitimizing belief. The plurality paradox calls for decision-
making that allows for unity as well as plurality to coexist, which requires dissensus and
consensus to hold equal status. This demand can not be housed by the monistic structure
of  the  state,  whose  method  of  forced  consensus  precludes  the  individual’s  ability  to
manifest their disagreement. As a result, we must look to non-statist orderings to fill the
legitimacy vacuum. 
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David Graeber, anarchist theorist and anthropologist, points out in his 2007 book
Possibilities  that state transcendence is indeed the thrust of contemporary theory and
practice: “In recent years, there has been a massive revival of interests in democratic
practises and procedures within global social movements, but this has proceeded almost
entirely  outside  of  statist  frameworks.  The  future  of  democracy  lies  precisely  in  this
area.” (Graeber, 2002: pg. 332) It will prove prudent, therefore, to look to propositions of
non-statist democratic organization whose foundations lie not in restrictive hegemony,
but the people as a whole. Challenges to the possibility of non-coercive will formations,
however, are not unique to state sovereignty. Invalidations of the general will can come
from the people as well. Democratic theory dealing with questions of organization free of
state hegemony, must grapple all the more with other forms of coercion that exist without
it. 
Section I: Demos vs. Ochlos
Jacques Rancière makes the important distinction between the demos, understood
as the power of the people, and the ochlos (gr. okhlos = “mob”), signifying the turbulent
unification of individual turbulences, or mob rule. It is this distinction which state theory
rarely makes, but any autonomous theory of political ordering should. In order to arrive
at  an  essentially  democratic  articulation  of  politics,  the  will  of  the  individual  must
therefore be free of hegemonic imperatives from above as well as turbulent pressures
from anywhere around them. Central to this undertaking is the preservation of plurality
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wherever it exists, so that false or whimsically formed unity can be disjoined before it
turns into a mob mentality. Hence, Rancière places his emphasis on dissensus, a central
function, not only under conditions of state rulership.
“Democracy exists  in a society” writes Rancière,  “to  the degree that the demos
exists as the power to divide the ochlos.” (pg. 32) According to this understanding, the
eminent power of the demos is its capacity for perpetual questioning and division and the
equalization  of  hierarchies  that  must  follow from this.  Rancière  argues  “The  Two of
division is the path followed by a One which is no longer that of collective incorporation
but rather that of the equality of any One to any other One.” (Rancière, pg. 32) In other
words, where the people have truly come to understand their role as such an equalizing
force, the ochlos would likely stand little chance of gaining any ground on the empowered
reasoning of each. Such a horizontal conception of democracy, however, stands in need of
practical qualification, as it seems that some form of mediative bodies would be required
to instill such a noble understanding of the demos in the people.
The challenge to a practical theory of  democracy,  as Rancière has shown,  is  to
preserve plurality against any number of unwarranted coagulations. Whereas democracy
instituted  within  the  framework  of  the  nation-state  is  conditioned  by  representative
buffers, constitutional provisions and other safeguards against the  ochlos, a non-statist
pursuit  of  democratic  practices  of  unmitigated  legitimacy,  must  move  beyond  such
institutions. The task is therefore to fully empower the demos without giving free reign to
its denatured form, the ochlos. In order to identify prudent answers to this challenge, it is
39
important  that  the  difference  be  formalized  between  the  demos and  the  ochlos:  The
demos constitutes the people as a body of individuals in their full faculty of being able to
form  consensus  where  it  emerges,  without  coercion,  and  equally  preserve  dissensus
wherever it exists; whereas the  ochlos constitutes the people as a body given to mass-
suggestion, the approbation of force, and other forms of intemperate will-formation. 
The specific definitions of the  demos and  ochlos elaborated in this paper, though
prompted by Rancière’s conception, seek to ground the two terms in their potentialities.
Thus,  the  term  demos is  invoked  as  an  ideal  ordering  of  individuals  that  meets  a
comprehensive demand for democratic legitimacy, whereas the ochlos should be thought
to embody all  possible deviations from such a scenario.  Hence,  demos and  ochlos are
mutually exclusive phenomena. Where the people are organized democratically, they are
not the ochlos, and where they take on the form of the ochlos, they do not qualify as the
demos. The demos can be held to exist where the following three criteria are met:
1. Where agreement exists between individuals, consensus is able to emerge. 
2. Where an indivdual or group of individuals disagree, they retain their right to 
remain exempt from consensus; ie. dissensus is preserved.
3. No external bodies (e.g. nations-states, corporations, unions) can infringe upon 
the decison-making autonomy of the individual or individuals forming a decision-
making group. 
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Where any of these three criteria are not met, the demos denatures into the ochlos. 
Section II: Councils and Parties
As the previous chapters argued, where decisions depend on a will-formation by
overarching sovereign power structures, they cannot be said to meet a comprehensive
legitimizing demand.  An augmented question that therefore  emerges is:  “under  what
conditions can decisions be formed that respect the will of the individual as part of the
demos,  without  reducing  it  to  the  ochlos?”  This  delicate  question  is  at  the  heart  of
contemporary  political  discussion,  and  brings  attention  to  the  uniqueness  of  the
democratic outset for decision-making that fully respects the will of each. It is expressed
in  Rousseau’s  general  will:  a  contingent  notion,  emergent  only  where  there  is  an
agreement of  individual  wills.  What results,  therefore,  is  the pursuit  of  a  democratic
process that can respect this legitimizing demand. 
The arguments of Lippmann and Laski have shown, that the monistic reduction of
the sovereign state is based upon a coercive construction of a hegemonic will, and can
therefore not be said to meet the legitimizing demand posited by a general will. Wherever
such forced aggregations of individual wills are absent, however, the demos can be said to
be  intact  and  legitimate  decision-making  possible.  To  the  extent,  therefore,  that
individuals  are  able  to  articulate  their  political  wills  independently  of  the  state,  the
possibility of a general will exists. For this reason, it can be said that decision-making
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models in pursuit of democratic legitimacy must proceed, at their most basic level, from
among the people. Only where this autonomous will-formation is fully recognised, can the
monistic reduction from above give way to pluralistic variegation from below. 
Recognizing the unique bottom-up prerequisite of the democratic project, James
Madison offered an astute comparison in his Federalist Paper No.14, with the republican
model:  “In a democracy the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a
republic  they  assemble  and  administer  it  by  their  representatives  and  agents.  A
democracy, consequently, must be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended
over a large region.” (Madison, pg. 1) According to Madison, democracy presupposes a
face-to-face interaction of individuals in a shared locale. Though it could be argued that
he  here  articulated  the  distinction  between  representative  democracy  and  direct
democracy, the invalidations of representative democracy as truly democratic, invariably
lead to an elaboration that would put bottom-up democracy broadly within the latter
domain. 
It  follows  from  Madison’s  insights  that  the  scale  of  democracy  is,  in  the  first
instance, local. Only where people can “meet and exercise government in person,” can it
be said that they are engaged in a free exercise of the faculties whereby they formulate
their individual wills. Much contemporary theory holds this participatory aspect to be of
central importance to the safeguarding of what Rancière has called the “power of the
demos.”  In  line  with  this  understanding,  Hannah  Arendt  argues  in  On  Revolution,
published in 1963, that “political freedom, generally speaking, means the right ‘to be a
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participator  in  government’,  or  it  means  nothing”  (Arendt,  pg.  210)  Participation  in
government  implies  an ability  to  influence  political  outcomes.  Without  some  form of
participation, the will of the individual cannot be reconciled to the will upon which a
system of governance bases its decisions. To Arendt, therefore, a democracy based upon
the legitimizing-belief of the people, is necessarily participatory.  Would this truly be the
case, however, ‘government’ would likely assume an altogether different form. 
Having shown that democracy must necessarily proceed from a direct interaction
among  individuals  on  a  local  level,  it  remains  to  be  investigated  what  form  this
participation might have to take. The town-hall  or town-square approach is generally
held to have been successfully adopted in Switzerland. Though popular plebiscites are
there  held  at  town,  canton  and  state  levels,  it  is  important  to  note  that  general
assemblies  are  held  in  only  two  cantons  and  that  popular  decisions  proceed  by
majoritarian vote. Furthermore, only select proposals are submitted to the consideration
of  the  population.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Wolf  Lindner  in  his  2007  essay  Direct
Democracy has described Switzerland as being merely a “semi-direct” democracy at the
federal level. The coercive element of such a state, whose executive functions can still
largely be executed on an partial basis of legitimacy, is thus still very much intact. The
search of truly bottom-up decision-making procedures will lead to autonomous, dynamic
forms of organization, whose decision-making scope is not predetermined, but contingent
upon the legitimizing belief of the demos. 
Historic attempts at bottom-up democracy that function seperately from the state
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apparatuses  are  discussed  by  Hannah  Arendt  in  the  chapter  “The  Revolutionary
Tradition and its Lost Treasure” of  On Revolution.  The so-called ‘councils’ -  emergent
during the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the attempts at Revolution in Germany in
1919 and Hungary in 1956 - were, according to Arendt, attempts at a truly new form of
order. “It is true enough,” she writes, “that the members of the councils were not content
to  discuss  and ‘enlighten  themselves’  about  measures  that  were  taken by  parties  or
assemblies.” (Arendt, pg. 255) Thus Arendt has shown that these movements rejected
external appeals to authority, and thus aspired to an internal genesis of the legitimizing
belief.  She  goes  on  to  argue:  “they  consciously  and  explicitly  desired  the  direct
participation of every citizen […] and as long as they lasted, there is no doubt that ‘every
individual found his own sphere of action and could behold as it were, with his own eyes
his own contribution to the events of the day’.” (Arendt, pg. 255) Here, then, can be found
instances of true bottom-up, democracy based upon the direct involvement of the demos. 
The councils existed in opposition to the revolutionary parties of the time, and were
thus largely dismissed by many contemporaries as utopian pipedreams. Designated as
attempts at a ‘direct regeneration of democracy,’ their true potential for bringing about
an  altogether  new  form of  democracy  was  thus  ignored.  Arendt  attributes  this  to  a
profound scepticism towards the people’s capacity for self-determined acts of foundation.
In transcending the party system, however,  these councils  also  uniquely exposed the
extent to which the revolutionary parties came into conflict, “with all assemblies, with
the  old  parliaments  as  well  as  with  the  new ‘constituent  assemblies,’  for  the  simple
reason  that  even  in  their  most  extreme  wings,  they  were  still  children  of  the  party
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system.” (Arendt, pgs. 255-256) Whereas the party organs of revolution relied on ‘ready-
made formulas’ for action - dispatched from above - the councils sought to invoke and
take account of the “average citizen’s capacity to act and form his own opinion.” (Arendt,
pg. 256) 
The direct engagement of individuals in the deliberative functions of the councils
was by no means a coincidental phenomenon, but followed naturally from the fact that
they had emerged directly out of the ferment of the people. As such, it could be argued
that  the  very  functioning  of  these  councils,  in  rejecting  pre-existing  hierarchies  or
legitimizing values, was predicated on a legitimizing belief of the demos. It was voluntary
association which formed these platforms for a new democratic order, though it need not
imply that they were perfectly inclusive or egalitarian. What can be deduced from the
fact that councils sprang up from disparate groups within society - ranging from students
in universities to workers, soldiers and civil servants - is that there existed a general
impetus within them, which uniquely qualified the councils across these different strata
of society. Arendt likens them to the original ‘cosociations’ of colonial North America,
thereby also alluding to their capacity for political foundation. 
Arendt sees in the councils of the European attempts at revolution in the 20th
century a refutation of the claims about human nature upon which Thomas Hobbes based
his  justifications  of  state  hegemony  -  namely  that  life  not  lived  under  the  aegis  of
Leviathan is bound to be “solitary, poor, nasty brutish and short.” (Hobbes, pg. 76) Thus,
she posits that “nothing indeed contradicts more sharply the old adage of the anarchistic
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and  lawless  ‘natural’  inclinations  of  a  people  left  without  the  constraints  of  its
government than the emergence of the councils that, wherever they appeared, and most
pronouncedly during the Hungarian Revolution, were concerned with the reorganization
of the political and economic life of the country and the establishment of a new order.”
(Arendt, pg. 263) Arendt’s treatment of the council systems puts forth the perspective
that  humans,  left  to  self-organize,  are  perfectly  capable  of  establishing  inclusionary
platforms  for  negotiating  decisions  that  are  free  from  suppression,  or  the  turbulent
tendencies historically attributed to the people ungoverned. 
The failure of the councils in laying the foundations for a new form of democracy,
Arendt attributes to the fact that their primarily political nature prevented them from
effectively engaging in an economic restructuring of their respective countries. The “chief
reason for their failure was not any lawlessness of the people,” writes Arendt, “but their
political  qualities.”  (Arendt,  pg.  267)  Thus,  it  would  appears  that  a  truly  “political”
platform of people, by virtue of its inclusionary and horizontal approach, is unable to
engage meaningfully with social and economic conditions largely determined by rigidly
coercive pre-conditions. In contrast, the “reason why the party apparatuses, despite their
many shortcomings […] eventually succeeded where the councils had failed lay precisely
in their original oligarchic and even autocratic structure, which made them so utterly
unreliable for all political purposes.” (Arendt, pg. 267) 
In arguing that the failures of the councils can be attributed to their horizontal
nature, whereas the successes of the parties lay in their hierarchical one, Arendt suggests
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that  purely  democratic  politics  may  be  fundamentally  impractical.  If  top-down
organizations are required to address social and economic problems, but only bottom-up
decision-making can be considered legitimate,  then it  would seem there is  no way to
legitimately  tackle  such  issues.  Hierarchical  structures  with  an  insufficient  basis  of
approval, however, can be argued to create more problems than effective solutions, by
their failure to account of the concerns and disagreements of individals. In such cases -
where no general will exists - it may indeed prove more prudent to maintain ambiguity
and  inaction,  until  better  proposals  are  made  known.  Furthermore,  decision-making
models preserving the three criteria of the  demos laid out above, could still give rise to
legitimate power structures. Horizontality can still give rise to verticality. 
Bottom-up council politics, when faced with hierarchical structures, are presented
with  a  historical  adversary  that  challenges  claims  to  its  feasibility.  This  practical
challenge  is  deeply  entwined  with  the  question  of  legitimate  authority  in  horizontal
politics. It is clear that despite their ‘grass roots’ origins in the people, the councils gave
rise to distinctions of power, predicated upon a great variety of preconditions: such as
gender, social status and charisma. Though the influence of such factors should by no
means be denounced as being altogether incongruous to a legitimate democratic process,
they would certainly have to preserve the conditions enumerated above. As the historical
failures of the council systems throughout Europe suggest, bottom-up politics need also to
be able to create power structures, lest they founder altogether. 
Section III: Agreeing to Disagree
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Considerations of a two-fold claim upon a bottom-up democratic theory, (ignoring,
for the present, the threat of external incursions) reveal profound underlying conundrum:
democracy needs to be fluid, in order to preserve plurality and the right of the dissenter,
yet rigid in order to give weight to the conviction of the demos where it proceeds from the
approval of all its members. Scale here re-enters the debate, because it is the measure
whereby it can be known whether a democratic process is able to retain its legitimacy on
all levels of influence. Robert Dahl in his 1994 essay  A Democratic Dilemma: System
Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation, frames the problem as the “democratic paradox
of size,” suggesting that a demand for citizen engagement and large-scale problems can, if
at all, only be reconciled with great difficulty: 
“In  very  small  systems  a  citizen  may  be  able  to  participate  in
decisions  that  do  not  matter  much  but  cannot  participate  much  in
decisions that really matter a great deal; whereas very large systems may
be  able  to  cope  with  problems  that  matter  more  to  a  citizen,  the
opportunities  for  the  citizen  to  participate  in  and  greatly  influence
decisions are vastly reduced. Taken to an extreme but perhaps not wholly
fanciful  limit,  the paradox would pose  a choice  between a  tiny unit  in
which citizens could exercise perfect control over,  say, the location and
upkeep of footpaths; or a world government necessary for preserving life
on the planet by preventing acute environmental degradations, but over
which citizens had only symbolic democratic control.” (Dahl, pg. 28) 
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Dahl has suggested that direct citizen engagement can only occur on a small scale -
the likes of a council - whereas on a large scale this possibility is curtailed by the need for
unified mobilization. The claim implicit in his analysis is that large-scale action cannot
proceed by a comprehensive legitimizing measure,  but would rely  on a disjunction of
approval and executive power. Control in such a case, argues Dahl, rests only with the
demos symbolically. The possibility for large-scale decision-making cannot be altogether
refuted, however, in the instance where it rests on a comprehensive general will. The
question, therefore, is: “If the exercise of decision-making authority were to be made fully
contingent upon the approval of the  demos, could large-scale political action ever take
place?” It is the claim of this chapter that it would. 
In  order  to  show  that  a  fully  contingent  form  of  bottom-up  democracy  -  as
elaborated  through  the  negation  of  the  monistic  reduction  and  the  invokation  of  a
complete  legitimizing  belief  as  embodied  by  Rousseau’s  general  will  -  can  allow  for
effective decision-making on local as well as supra-regional levels, it must be shown how
authority could proceed fully from the legitimizing belief of the demos. For such authority
to be deemed legitimate, its contingency must be complete. This could only be ensured by
the existence of a mechanism for the accounting of dissent, whose ubiquity would ensure
that no decision can be called coercive. Only where such a mechanism is complete, would
the  emerging  agreements  qualify  as  the  Rousseauian  general  will,  and  a  bottom-up
democratic order be justified in giving full reign to the powers that ensure the translation
of will into action.
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Though  Arendt  bemoans  the  failures  and  diappearance  of  the  revolutionary
councils, it could be argued that their legacy is still alive and well in many contemporary
incarnations. Most prominent among attempts at bottom-up democracy in recent times
has  been  the  work  of  the  Direct  Action  Network  (DAN),  a  loose  and  extensive
organization  of  affinity  groups  whose  protest  efforts  in  the  early  2000s  gained  them
widespread recognition and whose most  widely adopted method of  decision-making is
referred  to  as  the  ‘consensus  process.’  By  no  means  restricted  to  that  movement*I,
consensus was, however, popularized by DAN and thus became an integral element to
subsequent bottom-up democracy movements - including Occupy. Though, as its name
suggests, the pursuit of the consensus process is consensus, it is its non-coercive approach
and the inclusion of the so-called ‘block’ that potentially qualify it as being based in a
complete legitimizing belief. David Graeber, in his 2002 essay The New Anarchists offers
this description of consensus:
“The basic idea of consensus process is that, rather than voting, you
try to come up with proposals  acceptable  to everyone—or at  least,  not
highly  objectionable  to  anyone:  first  state  the  proposal,  then  ask  for
‘concerns’  and try  to  address  them.  Often,  at  this  point,  people  in the
group will propose ‘friendly amendments’ to add to the original proposal,
4I. It is worth noting that consensus is held to have been used by the Quakers, as well as most notably the Iroquis
Confederacy Grand Council, as far back as 1142.  (Johansen, pg. 1) Graeber expands this insight, arguing that there is
a  univeral  element  inherent  to  this  approach:  “Democratic  practises  -  processes  of  egalitarian  decision-making  -
however, occur pretty much anywhere, and are not peculiar to any one given “civilization,” culture or tradition. They
tend to crop up wherever human life goes on outside systematic structures of coercion.” (Graeber, 227: pg. 331) 
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or otherwise alter it, to ensure concerns are addressed. Then, finally, when
you call for consensus, you ask if anyone wishes to ‘block’ or ‘stand aside’.
Standing aside is just saying, ‘I would not myself be willing to take part in
this action, but I wouldn’t stop anyone else from doing it’. Blocking is a
way of saying ‘I think this violates the fundamental principles or purposes
of being in the group’. It functions as a veto: any one person can kill a
proposal completely by blocking it—although there are ways to challenge
whether a block is genuinely principled.” (David Graeber, 2002: pg.1) 
Consensus, as Graeber has here described it, offers a decision-making model that
gives  equal  weight  to  the  possibility  of  disagreement  as  it  does  the  possibility  of
agreement. Thus, a general will can emerge, provided there is no ‘principled’ block. The
block exists as the consensus-process’ most pertinent feature and it is important also to
note that means also are afforded within consensus to check this mechanism and thus to
ensure there is no abuse (discussed in Conclusion). Though Graeber’s description of the
consensus model portrays it as an effective small-scale approach, its hallmark, the block,
could arguably be introduced to a completely scalable model of democracy wherein the
individual need not be “in the room” to retain their right to political determination. The
block could become integral to any political  process in the same way that the vote is
today, provided it is implemented in such a way that consensus is curtailed only to the
extent that it would interfere with the individual’s own will. 
The  incorporation  of  dissensus  as  a  decision-making  provision  might  seem
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ludicrous in the context of interest-based politics, where it is more than feasible that a
contrarian  or  an  agent  provokateur  would  seek  to  sabotage  any  form  of  consensus-
building.  Thus Howard  Ryan argues  in his  1983 essay  Blocking Progress:  Consensus
Decision Making in the Anti-Nuclear Movement that “the will of the majority holds sway
in  voting,  while  an individual  or  minority  wields  power  in consensus.”  (Ryan,  pg.  6)
Indeed,  the problem of the sabotaging capacity with which the individual is  endowed
within the traditional consensus model is a serious one, which has resulted in a number
of organizations - such as the Southern California Alliance for Survival (AFS) mentioned
by Ryan - to abandon it in favour of majoritarian approaches. A common concern that
Ryan  identifies  is  that  though  blocks  can  usually  be  resolved  through  an  inquest
approach,  as well  as a re-drafting of  proposals,  it  becomes increasingly difficult  on a
larger scale, because “consensus means long, monotonous meetings.” (Ryan, pg. 3) 
Graeber suggests in his 2013 book The Democracy Project, that any political system
based,  however  loosely,  on  the  consensus  process  requries  a  turn  towards  a  view of
political  deliberation  as  “problem  solving  rather  than  as  a  struggle  between  fixed
interests.” (2013: pg. 205) With this in mind, the failures of the council systems as well as
consensus-based approaches could,  at least in part,  be attributed to the fact that the
political debate could not be shifted away from an interest-based struggle towards that of
a common problem. As Arendt argued, it was precisely this “disinterested” nature of the
councils  that  qualified  them for  a  quintessentially  political  and  horizontal  approach,
whereas she dismissed the hierarchical parties, despite their successes, as fundamentally
apolitical.  Whether  a  reframing  of  the  political  debate  around  problems  rather  than
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interests would allay the threat of sabotage is not, however, certain. Further, that the
traditional articulation of consensus could feasibly be introduced on any scale larger than
a council or affinty group is still unresolved. 
Ryan  points  out  that  “proponents  of  consensus  often  fail  to  recognize  that
preventing people from doing as they wish can be no less coercive than forcing them to do
as they do not  wish.”  (Ryan,  pg.  6)  What he has here identified  might be called the
‘tyranny  of  the  minority,’  whereby  the  individual  is  able  to  subvert  collective  action
proceeding from a general will. Ryan has here identified one manifestation of the ochlos,
namely coercion by the individual. This, however, need only be the case where a decision-
making  body  is  given  to  a  rigid  form  whose  function  is  dependent  on  a  unified
mobilization, which, as the preceding chapter has shown, would constitute a monistic
reduction. A response to this problem might be a qualification of the concept of the block:
“where someone choses to block a decision, they have the power to block it to the extent
that it affects them.” Thus, a block would be conceived not as a definitive invalidation of
political authority, but a sort of case-specific secession, resulting in fragmentation of the
sort that ensures a preservation of plurality. 
In addition to a shift from interest-based to a problem-based approach to decisions,
for the block-model to be practicable, it would require a turn from rigid to fluid forms of
body politic. Graeber argues that the idea of fully inclusive, constituency based decision-
making is misguided. Rather, “everyone affected by a project of action should have a say
in how it  is  conducted” (2007:  pg.  230)  but should not  be forced.  It  is  by avoiding a
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formalization of the decision-making body that everyone retains the right to an injunction
to  political  mobilization  where  it  would  affect  them,  without  depending  upon  their
involvement. Graeber likens this to a fluid form of problem solving used by the people of
Madagaskar  called  “fokon’olona,”  whose  intricacies  eluded  attempts  by  the  Malagasy
government to formalize them. What characterized it, however, is that “assemblies [are]
brought together around a particular problem […] uniting anyone whose lives are likely
to be affected by the decision made.” (Graeber, 2007: pg. 231) 
Where a decision-solving approach is adopted that frames issues around problems,
not interests, and is not based in rigid forms but fluid associations particular to those
issues, the block mechanism can feasibly be integrated. Unique to the block mechanism of
the  consensus  process,  despite  all  potential  pitfalls,  is  its  ability  to  indicate  the
emergence  of  a  general  will  i.e.  consensus  that  has  accounted  for  all  dissent.  A
comprehensive legitimizing measure could thereby be achieved, provided the block only
interfere  with  the  emergent  and  non-incursive  agreement  of  others.  The  threat  of
dissensus  keeling  over  into  the  realm of  consensus  is  real  only  to  the  extent  that  a
decision-making body seeks to arrive at consensus for all, as opposed to building upon it
wherever it emerges naturally. In the latter case, a block would affect the general will
only to the extent that it  had the potential  to interfere with the will  of  the blocking
individual.  Though  perhaps  only  a  tenuously  practicable  claim,  it  is  in  this  fine
theoretical interstice between consensus and dissensus that the democratic claim has any
hope of realization. 
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Dahl’s  paradox of  scale  poses a riddle that Arendt’s  councils  seemed unable  to
resolve and to which the ‘block’ may offer a key. For a political  model to give rise to
structures of decision-making authority that proceed from the legitimizing belief of the
demos, there must exist a mechanism for the accounting of dissent. It is only the ubiquity
of such a mechanism that can ensure the emergence of a Rousseauian general will, free of
coercion.  The  coercive  potential  of  the  block  itself  needs  also  to  be  pre-empted  by  a
framing  of  political  questions  around  common  problems  and  a  re-conception  of  the
decision-making  constituency,  away  from  a  firm  delimitation  towards  a  fluid  and
dynamic form of human association. Where this is achieved, the two-fold qualifications of
power -  consensus and dissensus -  are met,  and the general  will  can be legitimately
translated into action, at every level.  
How what has been proposed can feasibly be implemented, is, primarily, a spatial
question. Critchley proposes a conception of politics as “the praxis of taking up distance
with regard from the state, working independently of the state, working in a situation.”
(pg.  112)  Where  states  encompass  the  entire  globe,  autonomous  manifestations  of
alternatives  can only  occur within  their  pervasive  territorial  reach.  As  contemporary
attempts  at  bottom-up  democracy  have  shown  -  from the  Zapatista  Uprising,  to  the
Occupy Movement and elements of the Arab Spring - distance from the state must be
taken  up,  on  the  first  instance,  from within.  Thus,  the  distance  to  the  state  is  “an
interstitial  distance,  an  internal  distance  that  has  to  be  opened  from  the  inside.”
(Critchley, pg. 113) A plurality of interstices (Lat. interstitium = stand between), that, by
asserting their legitimacy over the state mechanisms would proliferate and connect with
55
other interstices, could eclipse the state altogether. 
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Conclusion:
“A new democracy must take account of the constituent dynamic of the
multitude  and  the  fact  that  its  plurality  refuses  to  be  reduced  to  an
unum.” (Hardt and Negri, pg. 310) 
The view of democracy elaborated throughout this paper is one which stands in
stark  contrast  to  the present-day  countenance  of  politics,  whose rigid  delineations  of
countries  and  constituencies  require  that  decisions  be  made  on  behalf  of  the  people.
These  delineations  follow  from  a  hostile  world-view  that  cites  the  threat  of  outside
incursion  and  disorder  as  justifications  for  hierarchy  -  decision-making  from  above.
Today’s vacuum of legitimacy is thus tied directly to statist forms of governance, whose
decisions derive from a hegemonic process of will-formation that is not fully contingent
upon the approval of the people. Based in assumptions of external threat, this exercise of
power  produces  the  very  effects  that  affirm its  premises.  It  is  in  recognition  of  this
circular  fallacy  that  I  have  sought  to  invoke  a  countervailing  and  arguably  utopian
narrative, (compare: Appendix A) answering to the call for a more democratic society. 
 “Rule  by  the  demos”  -  as  this  paper  has  argued  -  is  a  radical  demand,  which
invalidates  both  majoritarian  representative  governance  as  well  as  all  overarching
political structures proceeding from an incomplete legitimizing belief, i.e. that mobilize
power by the approval of a part, yet affect the whole. In opposition to the coercion of
monistic totality, the plurality of the  demos calls for bottom-up politics, where power is
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contingent  upon  the  approval  of  the  people.  Only  where  consensus  -  empowered
agreement - is subject to the possibility of dissensus - empowered disagreement - and vice
versa, is the demand thus honored. Integral to this new democratic narrative is a two-fold
belief: that a fluid conception of the people can give rise to much greater order than a
rigid one, and that the people as a whole know better what is in their common interest
than the few purporting to act on their behalf. 
Democracy,  in  its  ideal,  embodies  the  unique  possibility  of  true  legitimacy,  in
which complete approval exists and all disapproval has been accounted for.  It is this
intersection  of  the  legitimizing  body,  i.e.  the  people  -  named in  the  Greek word-root
‘demos’ - and their legitimizing belief, that can give rise to a general will. The  demos
exerts itself with a more rigorous measure for legitimacy than the rule of strength. The
advent  of  a  general  will  indicates  a  satisfaction  of  such  a  measure,  in  the  form  of
comprehensive agreement.  The effect engendered by the general will  is  its legitimate
justification for action. Where this is not met, a demand arises for some form of mediation
and, given a failure to assuage dissensus - secession or stoppage. 
Whereas  an  absence  of  complete  agreement  has  historically  been  taken  as
sufficient cause for coercion, in the interest of a ‘greater good,’ the new conception evolved
in this paper takes such an absence as sufficient cause for boycott. It might seem that the
view of  politics  advocated here is  a  sabotagist  one,  as  it  has  the potential  to  curtail
political activity altogether. Within a fluid association of individuals, however, a block
would not necessarily imply the curtailment of action altogether, but rather, to the extent
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that it would effect those who disagree with it. Dissensus, whose tool is the block, causes
fragmentation: the mark of plurality. The general will, taken as a qualification of action,
allows both for large-scale action and small-scale preservation of inaction. 
Wherever instances of agreement occur on the local scale, the possibility of large-
scale consolidation with other instances emerges. Break-away dissentient groups would
be able to block their actions in one of two ways: to the extent that they would affect
them, or completely. The particularity of the former type block must be noted: not to be
conceived  of  so  much  a  general  complete  negation  of  mobilization,  it  is  a  tool  of
fragmentation  specific  to  proposals.  A block of  the  type  that would invalidate  action
altogether would therefore have to assert its own legitimacy. Here arises the question
“how can the legitimacy of a challenge to the legitimacy of a proposal be established?” The
objectivity required of any endeavour that would be tasked with measuring a claim of
individual  coercion  up  to  the  projected  impact  of  proposed  actions,  would  be  with
difficulty  met.  A mediative  body devoted  to  this  form of  empirical  adjucation  would,
however, be necessary. 
The  mediative  bodies  of  a  bottom-up  democracy,  with  aspirations  to
omnilegitimacy, would likely approach most closely conventional judiciary bodies; insofar
as  they  would  seek  to  determine  empirically-based  truth  in  pursuit  of  definitive
judgements, and be composed, at least in part, of members of the public. The nature of
such  an  organ  can  only  be  loosely  apprehended,  without  practical  attempts  at
implementations  for  reference.  It  is  important,  however,  to  note  that  its  role  would
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largely be a scientific one, and the conclusions of its adjucatory power be contingent upon
a general will. In this case, however, the general will would be one emanating only from
the jury: a group of disinterested individuals, not staked on the outcome of the decision
and proceeding in their decision by the comprehensive legitimizing demand. Thus, the
block - by its appropriate implementation within an adjucative body - could serve as a
counterforce to misuses of the block. 
Besides a judicial organ of the sort elaborated above, an omnilegitimate democracy
would do away with a need for government. Where the state as a sovereign, overarching
exoskeleton is invalidated, what results is a facilitative structure whose sole designation
is to be a medium for the mobilization of action, proceeding from the will of the people. It
has  no  will  of  its  own  and  its  functions  could  basically  be  compared  to  those  of  a
switchboard: Where agreement exists in one locale, it connects this agreement to all other
instances of agreement in other locales. Where these connect, an order is formed that can
be described as a fluctuative - i.e. specific to each instance - form of unity. Wherever there
is  disagreement,  the  structure  blocks  the  ascencion  of  such  propositions,  thereby
preserving plurality. This facilitative function could be assumed altogether by a computer
program,  whose  algorithms  allow  agreement  only  to  emerge  where  it  constitutes  a
Rousseauian  general  will.  Such  a  program  might  process  proposals  in  the  following
manner:
1. Distribute proposals for publication to all locales likely affected by its proposed 
action.
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2. Allow a certain amount of time to pass. 
3. Check for blocks: 
3A. If there is no block, designate proposal as legitimate and allow action to 
proceed. 
3B. If block entails secession (specific block) allow action to proceed - on the 
provison of it being non-incursive to blocker.
3C. Where there is a block calling for complete (complete block) stoppage, 
notify local adjudicative body:
3.C.I. If adjucative body deems the complete block illegitimate, 
proposition is allowed to proceed. 
3.C.II. If adjucative body deems the complete block legitimate, 
proposition is struck down and must be redrafted. 
As the above delineation shows (also offered as diagrammatic representation in
Appendix B), proposals can be subject to two forms of block. The former - a specific block -
would allow for a decision to go forward, on the condition that it preserve the blockers
61
autonomy with regard to that decision. This block would be considered a secession from
the  body  of  consensus  and  the  general  will  that  follows,  though  it  would  neither
invalidate this general will nor call for adjucation. It would, however, place a qualifying
demand upon the proposition which, if disregarded, would invalidate the legitimacy of the
action. The latter type of block - a complete block - would however call for negation of
consensus and the prevention of a general will from forming on that proposition. Justified
grounds for such a block might be: concern either about fundamental and universally
detrimental implications of a proposition or that it could in no way be implemented in a
manner  that  would  preserve  that  individual’s  will.  A  comprehensive  block  would  be
subject to the judgement of the judicial organ; its judgements would be reached by the
same omnilegitimate decision-making process. 
A wholly technical conception of democracy may be too reductive, in that it doesn’t
give adequate recognition to the deliberative and mediational needs usually attributed to
bottom-up  forms  of  democracy.  By  offering  a  parametric  outline  of  the  Rousseauian
general will, however, it can be shown that at the heart of a bottom-up form of democracy
meeting a comprehensive demand for legitimacy, there need not be an administrative
government with an executive thought-process that is sovereign to, and therefore above,
the people. Rather, there would need to be only be a simple set of rules - as discussed in
Chapter 3 and elaborated above - instated either in a computer programme, or by a group
of individuals assuming that facilitative role. Such a rendering of democratic possibilities
also debunks the claim that bottom-up democracy requires the direct involvement of all
members and thus places an unrealistic demand on the time and capacities of people.
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Clearly, involvement in politics would here become an entirely voluntary exercise. 
While it might seem fantastical that giving more power to the individual to call
into question decisions would give rise to better ones, it is probable that where decisions
are  subject  to  more scrutiny  and a  more  rigorous  process  of  qualification  is  applied,
agreement takes on greater weight. With the added weight of comprehensive legitimacy
given to consensus, decisions take on an air of authority hitherto unknown. Though more
rare,  consensus,  wherever  it  would  emerge,  could  lay  claim  to  universality.
Counterintuitively,  it  would  therefore  seem,  true  political  authority  follows  from  the
possibility  of  its  complete  negation  by  the  demos.  Such  a  rarification  of  legitimate
decisions would therefore engender a shift in the sphere of politics: away from interest-
negotiation and toward problem-based politics. Underlying this claim is the belief that
what can most readily be agreed upon by the people are universal problems, thereby
qualifying these unqiuely for unified action. 
A popular  slogan of  the Occupy movement  declared:  “All  of  our grievances are
connected,” (see appendix C) revealing that at the heart of politics are common problems
that need to be solved by collective action. Although it could be argued that it is in our
common  interest  that  we  solve  problems,  framing  issues  as  problems  calls  for  a
cooperative  mind-set,  whereas  framing  them as  interests  calls  for  a  competitive  one.
Though partially an argument about the proclivities of human nature, it is also one about
the modern state-of-affairs, which is wrought with problems that customary majoritarian
party-politics have not effectively addressed, but have, in many cases, helped bring about.
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At  least  in  part,  this  failure  is  attributable  to  a  political  ordering  that  presupposes
interest-based conflict and seeks to suppress this by the disjunction of power between the
people and their representatives. 
Politics, in an omnilegitimate world, would differ most profoundly from what it is
today understood to be. All organs of action would assume a fluid form to mobilize where
there is consensus and work around dissensus. Groups of individuals - previously known
as consituencies - would now be affinity groups, wherein the individual would find the
power to influence affairst in the world around them, to the extent they wanted to and
could  enlist  the  agreement  of  their  peers,  while  acknowledging  their  justified
disagreement. Under such circumstances, any distinction between power and the people
previously sustained by sovereign hierarchies would disappear, politics would become a
public  affair  and  the  democratic  demand  be  redeemed  by  its  transformation  into  a
democratic reality. The omnilegitimate decision-making principles offered above, would
enable the coexistence of unity and multiplicity wherever they came about freely, thus
validating Rousseau’s general will and at last resolving the plurality paradox. 
It  is  its  rightful  claim  to  being  fully  legitimate,  that  distinguishes  the
omnilegitimate form of democracy from those preceding it. As such, it can be understood
as the culmination of an evolutionary process, whereby definitions of democracy have
expanded to accomodate an ever-growing measure of a legitimizing-belief. At the same
time, however, the unchanging ideal of democracy is contained within the Ancient Greek
roots of the term, wherefore it could also be held that it has merely been waiting to be
64
uncovered.  For  omnilegitimacy  to  take  root  and  thus  do  justice  by  the  democratic
demand, it must be planted within the interstices of the increasingly cracked foundations
of illegitimate power - growing to fill the legitimacy vacuum until all forms of coercion are
blotted out. Like a rhizomatic plant, hubs of legitimate action would put out horizontal
shoots and connect with other hubs, growing around blocks wherever they manifested
and reaching unknown heights. 
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Glossary:  
Authority: The recognized legitimacy of power by the demos. 
Autonomy: Manifestation of a will or wills free of coercion. Indicator of Omnilegitimacy. 
Block: Practical element of the democratic demand, whereby dissensus is made manifest 
and the possibility of a general will preserved. Two forms. (see: Complete block, Specific 
block)
Coercion: Force - misrepresenting the will of the individual & acting on such 
misrepresentations, or disregard of wills altogether.  
Complete Block: The contestation of a proposal as a whole, calling for its complete 
stoppage- a call for the curtailment of the consensus among others, its legitimacy it 
established by showing how said proposal would practically infringe upon the right to 
exemption from its impact. A subjective claim, it would have to be judged by a 
disinterested adjudicative organ (see: Judiciary) 
Consensus: empowered agreement; a necessary component of the general will and the 
democratic demand. 
Delegitimizing Belief: The disagreement of individuals with a decision and curtailing 
the emergence of a general will. 
Democracy: Rule by the People. Power of the People.
Democratic Demand: Implicit to the term democracy (anc. gr. demos = people, kratia = 
power, rule) - a call for decision-making power to be contingent upon the non-coerced 
approval of the comprehensive legitimizing measure that is the people as a whole, in 
accordance with its foundational value - being rule by the people.  
Democratic Foundational Value: Rule by the People. Power of the People.
Democratic Legitimizing Measure: The people. Also: Omnilegitimizing Measure. 
Democratic Legitimacy-belief: The justifying approval of political action by the 
people, this being the foundational value of democracy. 
Demos: The people free of coercion - give rise to general will.
Dissensus: empowered disagreement; a necessary component of the general will and the 
democratic demand. 
Foundational Value: That upon which a system of governance is based and from which 
it usually derives its name: i.e. (meritocracy, communism) 
General Will: Agreement of individual wills contingent upon the non-coercive approval 
of each and the absence of disagreement. Emerges from the Democratic Demand, 
indicating the satisfaction of its comprehensive legitimizing belief. Can be understood as 
both a litmus and a normative tool of non-coercion. 
Hegemonic: Dominating, coercive, from above. 
Interstice: Vacuous spaces opened up within the state by its failures to address the 
democratic demand - locales for new bottom-up organization. 
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Judiciary: An organ designated to judge the legitimacy of a block, composed of 
individuals not staked on the outcome and proceeding upon the emergence of a general 
will for its decisions. 
Legitimacy: Justification of political action, by appeal to an accordance with its 
foundational values.
Legitimacy-belief: The justifying approval of a political action by a body of individuals; 
in the case where a systems foundational values appeal to such.  
Legitimacy Vaccum: The absence of recognized decision-making authority, following 
from a failure to meet the democratic demand. (see: Interstice)
Legitimizing Measure: The body of individuals named by a system’s foundational 
values, upon whose legitimizing belief it relies. (see: Democratic leg. measure)
Monistic Reduction: The coercive reduction by the state of plurality to unity. (see: 
Public Opinion)
Ochlos: The people subject to coercion - cannot give rise to general will. 
Omnilegitimacy: Exists where the democratic demand is honored and the only type of 
action is that proceeding from a general will. 
Omnilegitimizing Measure: The demos. 
Power: Decision-making capability. 
Plurality Paradox: The seemingly contradictory needs for unified action and unforced 
multiplicity. Representative democracy (and all state-based governance), by its 
representative disjunction, forces unity - thereby obfuscating but not resolving this 
question. Omnilegitimacy resolves this, by showing that the possibility of unity and 
multiplicity can coexist non-coercively. 
Public Opinion: Generalization of individual wills in pursuit of unity, type of monistic 
reduction used in rep. democracies - coercive. 
Representative Disjunction: Break in the causal link between the will of the people 
and decision-making power inherent to rep. democracy. Stands in the way of true 
democracy. 
Sovereignty: Supreme power - can reside with the state or the people. 
Specific Block: The contestation of a proposal to the extent that it is thought to infringe 
upon individual’s will. Allowing a proposal to pass, it would attach a condition upon 
whereby the pursuant action could be deemed omnilegitimate insofar as it is the general 
will. 
State: A spatio-temporally rigid entity that is dependent upon a need for unified 
mobilization, which it attains forcefully. (see: Monistic Reduction)
Tyranny of the Minority: The threat of blocking being used as a form of sabotage - a 
possibility best pre-empted by basing proposals around common problems, not interests, 
as well as the division of block types (see. specific block & complete block) and the 
formalization of a process of adjudication (see: Judiciary). 
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Appendix A: 
Table Comparing Main Features of Old and New Democracy. 
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Appendix B: 
Omnilegitimate Decision-Making
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Appendix C:
“All Our Grievances Are Connected...”
taken May 1st, 2012 by Hans Kern
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